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1. Introduction 
Ownership structures play an important but complicated role in the innovation of 
listed firms, which account for a large proportion of private R&D (research and 
development) expenditures. On the one hand, listed firms have a natural advantage in 
innovation because the high risk associated with innovation can be well spread across a 
large number of shareholders. On the other hand, due to dispersed ownership, innovation 
in listed firms may be stunted due to agency problems. For example, since innovation 
activities are associated with high risks, the concern about being fired when innovation 
fails might discourage managers from investing in R&D (Kaplan and Minton, 2006; 
Aghion et al., 2013). Meanwhile, another agency problem emerges in some transition 
economies such as China where state ownership remains a strong element of corporate 
governance. Managers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have weak incentives to 
enhance firms’ competitiveness through innovation as these public employees cannot 
privatize the profits but have to bear the costs of R&D, such as innovation risks and 
outraged laid-off workers (Megginson, 2005). With the presence of the state as a 
shareholder, the influence of ownership structures on listed firms’ innovation is further 
complicated. This paper focuses on a specific force of external governance on 
innovation—the ownership by institutional investors—and its interaction with state 
ownership by examining Chinese listed firms’ patenting between 2002 and 2011. 
The relationship between institutional ownership and firm innovation has been 
examined and found to be positive by several studies on US listed firms (e.g., Francis and 
Smith, 1995; Bushee, 1998; Eng and Shackell, 2001; Aghion et al, 2013). However, such 
a relationship is rarely examined in a transition economy, where ownership structures of 
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listed firms are substantially different from those in developed economies. Unlike US 
listed firms, which are characterized by dispersed ownership and well-developed 
institutional investors, Chinese listed firms are characterized by concentrated ownership 
(e.g., state ownership) and an emergence of institutional investors. 2  This paper 
contributes to the literature by documenting the relationship between institutional 
ownership and firm innovation in China, which is the largest emerging economy in the 
world. 
On average, state shares are about one-third of total shares for Chinese listed firms. 
The predominance of state ownership in China results in the coexistence of two types of 
listed firms, SOEs and non-SOEs. There has been evidence consistent with Megginson’s 
(2005) argument that SOE managers have weak incentives to innovate (e.g., Hu and 
Jefferson, 2009; Lin et al., 2010; Boeing et al., 2016). However, it is so far unclear, both 
theoretically and empirically, how state ownership affects the relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm innovation, and through which channel if it is effective. 
This paper attempts to fill this gap. 
As discussed in the literature, active monitoring by institutional investors can act as 
an important mechanism to promote firm innovation. We expect that this positive effect 
should be more pronounced in China, where the scattered shares that institutional 
investors (e.g., mutual funds) pool together used to be held by individual investors, who 
generally free ride on monitoring. To further motivate our research, we turn to the “career 
concern” hypothesis, first proposed by Holmstrom (1999) and then tested by Aghion et al. 
(2013). Specifically, CEOs may be concerned that once involved in innovation they will 
                                                             
2 Similar to other transition economies, China’s institutions are under-developed. Despite its startling 
economic growth, China is one of the worst countries regarding property rights protection (La Porta et al., 
2004). 
4 
expose themselves to the risk of being fired for innovation-related stochastic reasons. 
Active monitoring by institutional investors may help to identify these stochastic reasons, 
thereby motivating CEOs to innovate (Aghion et al., 2013). 
We postulate that compared to non-SOEs, the manager market of SOEs is less 
competitive due to the bureaucratic arrangement in the SOE system. Ranked as 
government officers, the appointment of CEOs in SOEs is very selective, and the 
candidates generally come from current government officers and SOE top management. 
Given a relatively small pool of qualified candidates, CEOs in SOEs may still hold 
leading positions even though they are not qualified for business administration. 
According to the career concern view, the incentives of institutional investors for active 
monitoring should be reduced since firing an unqualified CEO is a major benefit of 
monitoring, and this benefit vanishes when it is unlikely that such a CEO can be replaced. 
We thus postulate that the positive effect of institutional ownership on firm innovation 
should be weakened when the manager market is less competitive as in the case of the 
SOE manager market.  
To generate a convincing proxy for the extent of firm innovation, we collect listed 
firms’ patenting records. It is well acknowledged that patents are heterogeneous in quality. 
We address the quality issue in two ways. First, to generate firms’ patent counts, we only 
count invention patents, which have the highest standards of novelty and technological 
inventiveness among the three types of patents granted by the SIPO (State Intellectual 
Property Office) of China. Second, we turn to forward citations to measure the quality of 
innovation output. 
By regressing listed firms’ patent counts on one-year lagged institutional ownership 
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with control for other influential factors as well as year and industry fixed effects, we find 
that the effect of institutional ownership is significantly positive. The relationship persists 
when we control for R&D investment, suggesting that the effect of institutional 
ownership is mainly through improving the R&D productivity. By examining different 
types of institutional investors, we further find that the positive effect of institutional 
ownership is attributed to mutual funds but not to the remaining domestic institutional 
investors. It is consistent with Chen et al.’s (2007) finding that “independent” institutional 
investors such as mutual funds tend to collect information and do active monitoring. 
Moreover, we find that the effect of QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor) 
ownership is positive, but it relies on the presence of mutual funds.  
Our study is less subject to endogeneity issues compared to the US case. As a 
developed economy, in the US institutional ownership is already stabilized, and its 
variations largely result from institutional investors’ portfolio adjustment. In contrast, as a 
transition economy, in China institutional ownership increased from only around 1% in 
2001 to over 25% in 2010, and the surge was largely policy driven. To further mitigate 
the endogeneity concern, we show that even the exogenous increase in a firm’s 
institutional ownership following its inclusion into the stock index has a positive effect 
on patenting. It is particularly so for mutual fund ownership. Additionally, the positive 
effect persists when we address the endogeneity problem by using firms’ “internal 
instruments” based on GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) estimations. Overall, we 
confirm a causal and positive relationship from institutional ownership, particularly 
mutual fund ownership, to firm patenting. 
Competition tends to increase innovation risks, thus making CEOs more concerned 
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about their career when carrying out innovation projects. The career concern hypothesis 
thus predicts a stronger effect of mutual funds on firm innovation when market 
competition becomes intensified. Consistently, we find that the effect of mutual funds on 
firm patenting is more pronounced when market competition is more intense. 
Further examinations reveal that the positive effect of mutual funds on firm patenting 
is more pronounced among POEs (firms with zero state ownership) than that among 
either minor SOEs (firms with positive state ownership but not more than 50%) or major 
SOEs (firms with state ownership greater than 50%). Moreover, all our major results 
persist when we use citation counts instead of patent counts to measure firms’ innovation 
output. Particularly, while mutual funds have a weak impact on the quantity of innovation 
(i.e., patent counts) produced by major SOEs, we find that there is no impact on these 
firms’ actual quality of innovation (i.e., citation counts). Overall, we conclude that 
mutual funds enhance firm innovation both quantitatively and qualitatively for Chinese 
POEs and minor SOEs, but not for major SOEs. 
We regard our study as an important complement to studies on institutional ownership 
and firm innovation. It contributes to this strand of literature in three ways. First, instead 
of a developed economy, we provide new evidence on the positive relationship in a 
transition economy. Second, by examining POEs, minor SOEs, and major SOEs 
separately, we highlight the important role that the competitiveness of the manager 
market plays on firm patenting through the career concern channel. Third, we are among 
the first to document the heterogeneous effects of different types of institutional investors 
(i.e., mutual funds, QFIIs, and other domestic institutional investors) on firm patenting. 
This paper is closely related to the burgeoning literature on corporate governance and 
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firm innovation in China. By examining Chinese listed firms for 2001-2004, Choi et al. 
(2011) find that foreign ownership and business affiliation are positively related to firm 
patenting. In a similar vein, Shapiro et al. (2015) investigate small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) in China and find that corporate governance and ownership are 
significantly associated with firm patenting. So far, the causality is not well established. 
This paper attempts to fill the gap by using a more updated and representative sample of 
listed firms, compared to earlier research. Additionally, our study explores the 
relationship between institutional ownership and firm innovation more rigorously and 
allows for a more causal interpretation.  
This paper also enriches the literature on state ownership and firm innovation in 
China. Consistent with Megginson (2005), Hu and Jefferson (2009) document that 
patenting propensities are much lower in SOEs than private firms; Lin et al. (2010) find 
that government ownership and its intervention in CEO appointments are negatively 
associated with firms’ R&D activities; Boeing et al. (2016) show that POEs obtain higher 
productivity returns from R&D than SOEs. Our study shows that the positive effect of 
institutional ownership on firm innovation barely exists among major SOEs, suggesting 
that major SOEs may further stunt their competitiveness improvement by insulating 
external governance from monitoring. 
This paper also contributes to the literature on innovation activities among listed 
firms in China. Studies using patent data in China are limited (Guan and Yam, 2015; 
Dang and Motohashi, 2015; Xie and Zhang, 2015), especially regarding listed firms (e.g., 
Boeing 2016; Boeing et al. 2016; Choi et al., 2011). It may be because obtaining 
innovation-related information (e.g., information on R&D and patenting activities) 
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requires the matching of different data sources. Compared to the previous literature, our 
patenting measure is more comprehensive in the sense that we use both patent counts and 
citation counts to measure firms’ innovation output. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior literature and 
formulates our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 shows the empirical 
results. Section 5 discusses policy implications. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review, institutional background, and hypothesis development 
In this section, we first review the literature on institutional investors and firm 
innovation. Then, we introduce the background of China’s economic transition by 
highlighting its special corporate governance within SOEs and its underdeveloped stock 
market. Last, we develop hypotheses by taking into account these special conditions. 
2.1. Institutional investors and firm innovation 
Characterized as highly risky, long-term, and complex, firms’ innovation activities 
tend to be poorly performed because corporate governance is generally not well designed 
to reflect these characteristics. Different from conventional projects, R&D projects are 
associated with high uncertainty and take multiple stages to succeed. Therefore, optimal 
incentive contracts motivating top managers to innovate should tolerate their early failure 
and share firms’ long-term success with them (Manso, 2011; Ederer and Manso, 2013). 
Since motivating innovation requires special incentive contracts, innovation activities 
may be poorly performed when the focus is to motivate a firm’s routine activities 
(Holmstrom, 1999). Another major difference of R&D projects from conventional ones is 
their heterogeneity (Hall, 1992), which makes it more difficult for outside investors to 
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estimate their potential value. Subsequently, when deciding whether to start an R&D 
project, top managers take into account not only its contribution to the firm’s long-term 
performance but also the difficulty of acceptance by the market due to its low visibility. 
Theoretically, institutional investors, acting as an important force of corporate 
governance, can influence firm innovation in both directions. On the one hand, 
institutional investors may impede firm innovation. Stein (1988) suggests that constant 
pressures on delivering good short-term performance may result in managers avoiding 
long-term projects. Ferreira, Manso and Silva (2014) argue that the stock market may 
force managers to choose projects that are more visible to investors; consequently, 
managers may forgo R&D projects and instead adopt conventional projects. Such 
managerial short-termism can be further deteriorated by institutional investors acting as 
speculators, who care little about firms’ long-term performance. As documented by 
Bushee (1998, 2001), short-term-focused institutional investors can force managers to 
sacrifice innovation for better short-term performance.  
On the other hand, institutional investors may promote innovation. Compared to 
individual investors, institutional investors are more sophisticated and more capable of 
tolerating the heterogeneous risks from R&D projects by holding diversified portfolios. 
By pooling the scattered shares from these individual investors, institutional investors 
with larger ownership have more incentives to actively monitor as well as to collect 
costly but valuable information (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Particularly, there are two 
possible channels through which institutional investors motivate CEOs to invest more in 
innovation.  
One possible channel is that when innovation is not fully motivated by incentive 
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contracts, institutional investors encourage firm innovation by insuring CEOs against the 
early failure of innovation projects (the “career concern view”). Specifically, a CEO may 
be concerned that once involved in innovation he will expose himself to the risk of being 
fired for innovation-related stochastic reasons (Holmstrom, 1999; Manso, 2011; Ederer 
and Manso, 2013). Active monitoring by institutional investors can identify these 
stochastic reasons, thereby motivating the CEO to innovate (Aghion et al., 2013). 
The other possible channel is that CEOs prefer a quiet life, which can be regarded as a 
“rent seeking” activity (Hart 1983; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003), but institutional 
investors force them to innovate (the “rent seeking view”). Hicks (1935) regards a quiet 
life as a monopoly rent, in which CEOs tend to avoid difficult decisions and costly efforts 
in the absence of efficient governance. Since innovation needs extra efforts and 
intelligence, it is reasonable to expect that CEOs have incentives to shirk. By active 
involvement in a firm’s daily management activities, institutional investors can force the 
CEO to put more efforts on innovation activities (Hart, 1983). 
Empirically, the relationship between institutional ownership and firm innovation has 
been examined by several studies on US listed firms, and it is generally found positive 
(e.g., Francis and Smith, 1995; Bushee, 1998; Eng and Shackell, 2001; Aghion et al, 
2013). Francis and Smith (1995) show that ownership concentration (including 
institutional investors) is positively associated with R&D expenditures. Eng and Shackell 
(2001) document a positive relationship between institutional ownership and R&D. 
Bushee (1998) finds that firms with higher institutional ownership are less likely to cut 
R&D following poor performance. Aghion et al. (2013) show that institutional ownership 
positively influences firms’ patenting by mitigating CEOs’ career concerns. They also 
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discover that this positive effect is more pronounced when product market competition is 
more intense. However, such a relationship is rarely examined in a transition economy, 
where stock markets and ownership structures of listed firms are substantially different 
from the US as well as other developed economies. 
2.2. Background of China’s economic transition 
2.2.1. SOE reform 
In the pre-reform planned economy, China’s industry was dominated by SOEs, which 
acted as units of fulfilling production quotas rather than pursuing profits. In terms of 
choosing SOE top managers, Groves et al. (1995) provide the following discussion: 
“Enterprise managers were hired and fired by officials in the industrial bureaus, 
which were in turn organized into sectoral and geographical divisions. The entire 
industrial system was accountable to a national or regional planning commission, 
which steered the entire system through a complex system of highly specific 
commands that extended all the way down the hierarchy to managers at the plant 
level. Authority relations were complicated by the intrusive role of the Communist 
Party, which functioned more or less as the personnel department of this enormous 
corporation, maintaining dossiers and tracking managerial careers.” 
Since 1978, SOEs have gone through two major reforms to meet China’s transition 
towards a market economy. In the first stage, the responsibility contract was introduced 
into SOEs, which increased managers’ incentives while keeping the state ownership 
untouched (see Groves et al., 1995). In the second stage, following the policy of 
“grasping the large and letting go of the small (Zhuada Fangxiao)”, since 1997 large 
SOEs have been corporatized and small ones have been privatized or closed (see Hsieh 
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and Song, 2015). Some of these large SOEs become partially privatized by selling shares 
to individual investors through IPOs (initial public offerings). These listed firms were 
generally carved out from an existing SOE, which retained a substantial proportion of 
shares.3 
Despite these reforms, the system of choosing SOE managers has barely changed. 
Listed SOEs still satisfy the major characteristics proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
well; that is, SOEs are controlled by government officers who have strong control rights 
but no significant cash flow rights. Two major differences from the pre-reform period are 
that industrial bureaus, which were in charge of managing SOEs, no longer exist, and 
SOEs have become more profit oriented.  
Instead of industrial bureaus, SOEs are now managed by other bureaucratic agencies, 
such as the SASAC (State-Owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission). 
Representing the interest of the state as shareholders (Naughton, 2007, p.303), these 
bureaus have no cash-flow rights from the shares that they manage, but exclusive rights 
on appointing SOE managers. According to the Corporate Law, it is the board of directors 
who make personnel decisions. In practice, listed SOEs’ board chairman and CEO are 
predetermined by the associated bureaucratic agency, and the board only rubber-stamps 
the decision. With governments’ direct control of CEO appointment, it is not surprising 
that SOE managers tend to give priority to bureaucrats’ interests while minority 
stakeholders’ interests are largely ignored. The major problem is that the two groups’ 
interests may be conflicting: bureaucrats’ interests are to achieve their political goals and 
to pursue their private benefits, which are often different from and sometimes against the 
goal of improving SOEs’ profitability (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
                                                             
3 Meanwhile, private firms in China grew rapidly and some of them became listed (Chen et al., 2008). 
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One key factor that remains unchanged in SOEs is that their top managers are still 
treated as government officers; they are selected through a political process but not 
chosen completely based on their business acumen. Candidates generally come from the 
pool of current SOE managers and government officers. The selection process is similar 
to that in China’s political system as described by Li and Zhou (2005): 
“China is a unitary state and its political system is broadly composed of five layers 
of state administration: the center (zhongyang), provinces (sheng), prefectures 
(diqu), counties (xian) and townships (xiang). The Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) acts as the headquarters of this multidivisional 
system, which ultimately controls the mobility of government officials within the 
system. This highly centralized structure of personnel control remains intact even to 
this day.” 
SOEs are regarded as part of this political system, and their political rankings can be as 
high as the ministerial (equivalent to provincial) level, so are SOE top managers. To be 
consistent with the Corporate Law, the top position in listed SOEs is the party secretary 
who is also appointed as the board chairman, followed by the CEO who routinely sits in 
the party committee.4 It echoes the dual presence of the communist party and the 
government administration in China’s bureaucratic hierarchy. In contrast, the selection of 
top managers in non-SOEs is not subject to these restrictions; thus, non-SOE managers 
are faced with more potential competitors to replace them. As a result, it makes the 
non-SOE manager market more competitive than the SOE manager market.  
To meet the financial performance indicators set by the government and to secure 
promotion, top managers in SOEs generally choose to closely follow instructions from 
                                                             
4 Wang (2014) rationalizes this due governance structure in SOEs through a political approach. 
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above rather than to engage in independent inquiry. With the introduction of the National 
Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (MLP) in 
2006, innovation performance indicators are included in governmental evaluations of 
SOEs in a top-down approach (Chen and Naughton, 2016). These indicators are specified 
in terms of the quantity of patent applications instead of their quality, the latter being hard 
to specify ex ante. Consequently, a typical SOE has incentives to “produce” the required 
amount of patent applications while caring little about its innovation quality. Combined 
with complementary patent subsidies by local governments, the MLP further stimulated 
SOEs to file more low-quality patent applications (Zhang and Zhong, 2016). 
Under China’s institutional background, China’s POEs may also act differently from 
US firms. As Chinese entrepreneurs grew up in an opportunity-driven business 
environment with high political uncertainty, top managers in POEs were used to making 
strategies within a short-term horizon. Investment in innovation or technological 
specialization was less attractive to them than pursuing short-term profits by diversifying 
to rather unrelated industries.5 China’s recent innovation-oriented policy may also induce 
POEs to “produce” more low-quality patent applications to receive patent subsidies. 
Overall, the necessity to invest in innovation for long-term competition advantages is 
only gradually understood by the majority of both SOEs and POEs, even among listed 
firms. 
2.2.2. China’s stock market 
It was not allowed to trade stocks in China until the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) opened in the early 1990s. A listed firm’s shares 
                                                             
5 One notable example is Chinese listed firms’ diversification into the real estate industry during the 
housing boom period as documented by Rong et al. (2016). 
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can be classified as domestic (A-shares) and foreign according to shareholders’ 
residency.6 Not all A-shares are publicly tradable, but it is required that tradable A-shares 
account for at least 25% of total shares when a firm goes public. Non-tradable A-shares 
compose three different types, state shares, legal person shares, and employee shares.7 
The proportions of state shares, legal person shares, employee shares, and tradable 
A-shares were 28%, 29%, 0.03%, and 42%, according to Chen et al.’s (2013) calculation 
on non-financial listed firms in 2004. 
At the early stage, tradable A-shares were mostly held by individual investors, and 
then institutional investors were introduced into the secondary market, among which we 
focus on mutual funds. Following the policy of “extraordinarily developing institutional 
investors” and with the introduction of open-end mutual funds, mutual funds have been 
growing rapidly since 2001. Figure 1 plots the time trend of institutional ownership and 
those of its three components, QFIIs, mutual funds, and other domestic institutional 
investors. Overall, there was a dramatic increase in the ownership of institutional 
investors during our examination period. The major contributors to the growth were 
mutual funds and other domestic institutional investors while the contribution of QFIIs 
was negligible. Mutual fund ownership increased from less than 1% in 2001 to 5% in 
                                                             
6 Foreign shares include B-, N-, and H-shares. B-shares are traded domestically but separately from 
A-shares. They are denominated in US dollars on the SHSE and in Hong Kong dollars on the SZSE, 
respectively. N- and H-shares are referred to shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange and the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange, respectively. About 10% of listed firms have issued at least one type of foreign 
shares (Chen et al., 2013). 
7 The state shares are held by the central government, local governments, and solely SOEs. The legal 
person shares are held by other domestic institutions including SOEs that are not solely state-owned. The 
employee shares are offered to employees, including workers and managers, by the listed firm, usually at a 
substantial discount. Non-tradable shares are transferable but not through the open markets. On average 
less than half of shares in listed firms are tradable, making the stock market volatile. To solve the problem, 
in 2005 and 2006 authorities launched the Split Share Structure Reform. We tend to believe that this reform 
had limited impacts on our study, given that there was at least a two-year trading-window restriction after 
the reform. We will come back to this issue in the later section. Tan et al. (2014) document a positive effect 
of the reform on firm innovation. 
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2007 and then was stabilized. Since the Split Share Structure Reform launched in 2005, 
other domestic institutional ownership began to surge and became the major contributor 
to the growth. 
Compared to average state shares and legal person shares of about 30% each, the 
proportion held by any individual or institutional investor is negligible. Consequently, 
ownership structures in China are highly concentrated. The largest shareholder usually 
controls the firm effectively (Chen et al., 2008). Because state and legal person shares are 
non-tradable, it makes the largest shareholder almost indifferent to stock price changes. 
In contrast, there are over 100 million individual investors typically holding a tiny 
proportion of a firm’s total shares. These individual investors tend to be free riders, who 
have little incentives to actively participate in corporate governance (Tenev et al., 2002). 
Moreover, most individual investors are characterized as short-term speculators instead of 
long-term investors, one piece of evidence being that the annual share turnover rate was 
about 350% on average for 2001-2007.8 In contrast, the NYSE (New York Stock 
Exchange) website reports that the annual share turnover rate on the NYSE was about 
100% in 2003.  
2.3. Hypothesis development 
2.3.1. Gross effect 
As revealed by the literature, monitoring by institutional investors has acted as an 
important mechanism to mitigate managerial short-termism, managerial slack, and their 
career concerns, thereby promoting firm innovation. This positive effect should be more 
pronounced in China, where the scattered shares that institutional investors pool together 
                                                             
8 The annual turnover ratio is calculated as the ratio of total trading value over total tradable value of 
A-shares on both exchanges for a given year.  
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used to be held by individual investors who were less educated and were generally 
characterized as frequent traders thus prone to free ride.  
However, there are different types of institutional investors, and apparently not all 
types are equally active in monitoring. For example, Bushee (1998) finds that short-term 
institutional investors result in managerial short-termism while long-term institutional 
investors reduce this tendency. Chen et al. (2007) find that “independent” institutional 
investors tend to collect information and do active monitoring while “grey” institutional 
investors tend to hold shares quietly. They define mutual funds and investment advisers 
as “independent”, and bank trusts, pension funds, insurance companies, and other 
institutions as “grey.” Moreover, it has been found that mutual funds positively influence 
Chinese listed firms’ performance (Yuan et al., 2008).9 Accordingly, we postulate that if 
institutional investors contribute to firm innovation in China, mutual funds that have 
strong incentives to monitor (i.e., independent institutional investors) should play a more 
important role in promoting firm innovation. We thus frame our main hypothesis as 
follows. 
Main hypothesis: Institutional investors, particularly mutual funds, positively influence 
firm innovation. 
There is a special type of institutional investors, QFIIs.10 To make the domestic 
financial system more internationalized, China began to allow QFIIs to enter the A-share 
market in 2003. To become a qualified QFII, a foreign investor is required to have been 
managing assets of at least 10 billion US dollars. Consequently, QFIIs in China are 
exclusively composed of internationally well-known funds and investment banks. With 
                                                             
9 The earliest related study can be traced back to Xu and Wang (1999), in which they find a positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance. 
10 For more information about the development of QFIIs in China, please refer to Liu et al. (2014). 
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rich experiences and financial prudence, these foreign institutions are supposed to 
enhance corporate governance in China, which has lagged behind the international 
standard. Moreover, cross-country studies have documented that foreign institutional 
investors enhance firm innovation (e.g., Bena et al., 2015; Luong et al., 2014). 
Accordingly, we hypothesize that the effect of QFIIs on firm innovation is positive. 
However, compared to an average of 3.6% in other emerging economies documented by 
Luong et al. (2014), QFII ownership in China is extremely low, at about 0.1% in our 
sample.11 Thus, we expect that the mechanism of QFIIs influencing firm innovation in 
China may be different from other emerging economies.  
2.3.2. Mechanism analysis 
Though the career concern view and the rent seeking view both predict a positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and firm innovation, these two views have 
different predictions regarding the interaction effect between product market competition 
and institutional ownership. Based on the career concern view, the positive effect of 
institutional ownership on firm innovation should be stronger when competition is more 
intense (Aghion et al., 2013). The intuition is that when there are more competitors, R&D 
becomes more risky because the innovation output, once produced, is more likely to be 
replicated by competitors. This concern becomes even more critical in a transition 
economy like China, where the IPR (intelligent property right) is poorly enforced (e.g., 
Allen et al., 2005; Ang et al., 2014; Fang et al., 2015).  
In contrast, from the rent seeking view, competition has two effects (Schmidt, 1997). 
On the one hand, more competition results in fewer economic rents for CEOs to exploit. 
                                                             
11 According to Luong et al. (2014), as an average firm in emerging economies, foreign institutional 
ownership is much higher than domestic institutional ownership (3.6% vs. 0.7%), which presents a sharp 
contrast to the situation in China where the domestic institutional ownership dominates. 
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On the other hand, more competition raises the probability of bankruptcy, forcing CEOs 
to work harder. Overall, the rent seeking view predicts that when competition is more 
intense, there should be less managerial slack and thus institutional investors’ monitoring 
becomes less valuable. We thus come up with two competing hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1a (Career Concern View): The positive effect of institutional (or mutual 
fund) ownership on firm innovation is stronger when market competition is more intense. 
Hypothesis 1b (Rent Seeking View): The positive effect of institutional (or mutual 
fund) ownership on firm innovation is weaker when market competition is more intense. 
Additionally, China’s unique situation, the coexistence of POEs, minor SOEs, and 
major SOEs in the stock market, provides us with an ideal environment to investigate 
how the effect of institutional ownership on firm innovation varies with different extent 
of state ownership from the perspective of both views. We first compare POEs with major 
SOEs and then discuss minor SOEs as a hybrid of the other two. 
From the career concern view, institutional investors can monitor a firm’s R&D 
process so that when there is an R&D failure, they know whether it is due to stochastic 
reasons or due to CEOs’ low ability. Consequently, by monitoring, institutional investors 
expect to benefit not only from boosted firm innovation but also from enhanced firm 
value if a low-ability CEO is identified and replaced. Thus, institutional investors’ 
expected benefit from monitoring should be higher when they hold a larger proportion of 
the firm’s stocks or when a low-ability CEO, once identified, is more likely to be 
replaced. The career concern view thus postulates that when an institutional investor 
holds a larger proportion of the firm’s stocks or when a low-ability CEO is more likely to 
be replaced, the investor is more likely to monitor, and thus the CEO is less concerned 
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about his career, thereby having more incentives to innovate.12 
Compared to POEs, CEOs in major SOEs are generally selected from the pool of SOE 
managers and government officials rather than from the outside manager market. 
Meanwhile, it is reasonable to expect that it is hard, if not impossible, for the government 
to accept a professional manager recommended by institutional investors as the new CEO. 
We thus expect that top managers in major SOEs are less likely to be fired, given that 
qualified candidates to replace them are limited. Consequently, the career concern view 
predicts a positive effect of institutional ownership on firm innovation among POEs but 
not among major SOEs. 
Hypothesis 2a (Career Concern View): The positive effect of institutional (or mutual 
fund) ownership on firm innovation is stronger among POEs than among major SOEs. 
The rent seeking view postulates that CEOs prefer a quiet life but institutional 
investors force them to innovate. However, a quiet life is more likely to happen in major 
SOEs than in POEs, given that CEOs in major SOEs are essentially government officers 
and thus less likely to be replaced. Therefore, the rent seeking view predicts a stronger 
effect among major SOEs. 
Hypothesis 2b (Rent Seeking View): The positive effect of institutional (or mutual 
fund) ownership on firm innovation is stronger among major SOEs than among POEs. 
Studies have found important differences in innovation behavior between major SOEs 
and minor SOEs (e.g., Cai and Tylecote, 2008; Boeing, 2016). Cai and Tylecote (2008) 
find that ownership types matter, but governments’ influence over management selection 
                                                             
12 Aghion et al. (2013) simply assume that the CEO market is completely competitive; that is, a firm can 
set a wage lower than a CEO’s reservation utility so the CEO will choose to leave once found to be 
low-ability. Though this assumption may be a good approximation of the situation in the US, it is not so 
regarding the situation in China, especially when major SOEs are observed. To better reflect the situation in 
China, we modify Aghion et al.’s (2013) model by introducing some friction in the CEO market (not 
reported in the paper). Our derivation based on the modified model further confirms the above argument. 
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matters more. Minor SOEs, which are semi-privatized and with arms-length relationships 
to governments, have the highest dynamic technological capability compared to both 
POEs and major SOEs. By investigating the effect of government R&D subsidies on 
private R&D expenditures, Boeing (2016) shows that only minor SOEs do not substitute 
their own funds with government grants, thereby increasing their R&D intensity more 
than the other two firm types. 
Compared to major SOEs, top managers in minor SOEs should be more likely selected 
by shareholders instead of administrative authorities. Though data limitation does not 
allow us to know exactly how top managers are elected, we shed some light on this issue 
by turning to Cai and Tylecote (2008). According to their manually collected data of 
telecommunication firms, all POEs’ top managers are selected by shareholders, but major 
SOEs’ top managers are not. Top managers in major SOEs are either selected (46.4%) or 
recommended/approved (53.6%) by administrative authorities while these proportions are 
only 10.5% and 31.6% in minor SOEs. Based on the career concern review, it is thus 
reasonable to postulate that the effect of institutional ownership on firm innovation 
among minor SOEs should lie between major SOEs and POEs, given that the selection of 
CEOs in minor SOEs can be regarded as a hybrid of the other two. 
 
3. Data 
Our data cover the population of Chinese domestic firms listed at the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 2001 and 2011. As suggested by Long et al. (1999), 
the information efficiency of China’s stock markets had reached a reasonable degree 
before the 2000s. Data on Chinese listed firms have been widely used in high-quality 
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publications (e.g., Fisman and Wang, 2010; Kato and Long, 2006; Fernald and Rogers, 
2002). 
Our fundamental data on financial statements and capital market information are 
obtained from the Chinese databases, WIND and GTA CSMAR. The data on firm 
ownership are obtained from RESSET. In this section, we first describe in details about 
innovation-related measures, including patent counts, citation counts, and R&D stocks, 
and then we describe the sampling process and provide summary statistics. 
3.1. Innovation-related measures 
Our patent data come from PATSTAT.13 We follow the approach detailed in Boeing 
et al. (2016) to match listed firms to patent data. Using patent data to measure firms’ 
innovation output has the following advantages. The examination of patent applications 
follows a consistent and rigorous process. As a result, patent data systematically capture 
the progress of innovation in China. China has signed all major international conventions 
about intellectual property rights (Yang and Clarke, 2005).14 Moreover, it has been 
documented that China is transferring to an economy of innovation from one of imitation 
(e.g., Cai and Tylecote, 2008; Guan et al., 2009). 
We construct two measures of firms’ innovation output as follows. The first measure 
is patent counts. The Chinese patent system grants three types of patents: innovation, 
utility, and design patents. Among them, innovation patents are of the highest novelty and 
technological inventiveness. To be granted, the application for an invention patent must 
meet the requirement of “novelty, inventiveness, and practical applicability.” In contrast, 
utility or design patents only require that a similar application has not previously been 
                                                             
13 April 2013 version of the EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database PATSTAT. 
14 These conventions include the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (1980), the Paris 
Convention (1985), the Madrid Agreement (1989), and the Integrated Circuits Treaty (1989). 
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granted.15 We thus focus on those invention patents. Doing so also enables us to avoid 
double counting of invention and utility/design patents, which may be filed 
simultaneously for the same underlying invention. 
Our patent counts are based on patent families instead of patent applications. The 
reason is that the number of families better reflects the number of inventions. When 
counting patent families, we rely on the INPADOC family definition in PATSTAT. To 
better reflect a firm’s innovation output that is generated in a given year, we count patent 
families based on the priority application year. 
Even though we exclusively count invention patents, the quality of these patents 
remains highly skewed (Gambardella et al., 2008). As documented by Li (2012), 
subsidies have contributed to the recent patenting expansion in China, which leads to a 
common concern that patent counts measure the quantity but not the quality of inventions 
(Dang and Motohashi, 2015). As a result, one may mistakenly conclude that a firm 
becomes more innovative in the presence of institutional investors, but in fact the firm 
only files more patent applications while the actual number of inventions remains 
unchanged. For example, Lei at al. (2012) show that firms in China exhibit patent filing 
peaks in December to meet annual patenting quotas by splitting a patentable invention 
into multiple applications. 
As forward citations provide a reliable approximation of patent quality (Gambardella 
et al., 2008; Reitzig, 2004), we generate our second measure of innovation output, 
citation counts (i.e., citation-weighted patent counts). The rationale is that citations by 
                                                             
15 These three types of patents also differ in application processing time and strength of protection. It 
generally takes more than one year to grant an invention patent. The processing time is about six months 
for utility-model patents, and even shorter for external-design patents. The term of protection is 20 years for 
invention patents, but only 10 years for the other two types. 
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subsequent patents indicate higher commercial value and technological impact of the 
underlying invention (Jaffe and De Rassenfosse, 2016; Hall et al., 2005; Harhoff et al., 
1999; Trajtenberg, 1990). To solve the constraint that the SIPO of China does not 
disclose citation data, we follow Boeing (2016) and use citations generated by patent 
applications filed via the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).16 Specifically, we count PCT 
forward citations at the family level received within the first three years after the 
publication of the priority application. After counting citations for each patent application, 
we generate a firm-year’s citation counts by computing the citation-weighted number of 
patents that the firm applied for in the given year. 
Last, to measure innovation input, we obtain R&D expenditures from the WIND 
database for 2006-2010 and manually collect complementary information for earlier 
years. To generate the R&D stock, we rely on the perpetual investment method and 
calculate the deflated R&D stock based on an annual growth rate of R&D of 5% and an 
annual depreciation rate of 15%.17 To account for the fact that some firms release no 
R&D expenditure (either because they conduct no R&D or because they fail to report it), 
we generate a zero-R&D dummy that equals one if no R&D stock can be generated, and 
zero otherwise.  
3.2. Descriptive statistics 
Our examination is restricted to firms listed on the main board of the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Specifically, our sampling process is as follows. First, we 
restrict the sample to the years 2001-2011 to account for an 18-month publication lag. In 
this way we make sure to observe those patents with a priority application date between 
                                                             
16 See Boeing and Mueller (2016) for more details on the PCT system. 
17 These two rates are regarded as the standards in the literature (Hall et al., 2009).  
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2001 and 2011. Second, we restrict the sample to those firms with their main business in 
manufacturing or IT industries as innovation is of pivotal importance in these sectors. 
Third, taking into account that R&D expenditures affect patent applications with a short 
lag (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p.795; Griliches, 1990) and to avoid simultaneity 
between innovation output and firm characteristics, we forward our outcome variables, 
patent counts and citation counts, by one year. Accordingly, we delete observations of the 
year 2011. Last, we delete observations with strange or invalid values.18 After these 
procedures, our final sample has 8,412 observations representing 1,248 firms. 
Table 1 reports summary statistics of major variables. Each variable is defined in 
Appendix 1. All monetary terms are in real values (2005=100) and their units are million 
yuan. Due to our data preparation, statistics for outcome variables are calculated based on 
the observations from 2002 to 2011, while statistics for independent variables are from 
2001 to 2010.  
The distribution of patent counts is highly skewed, with a mean of 9.13 and a 
maximum of 5,937.19 On average, each firm receives 1.16 citations annually while the 
maximum is as high as 1,697. Institutional ownership is distributed between 0% and 
92.55%. To its mean of 11.09%, other domestic investors contribute 7.48, mutual funds 
3.53, and QFIIs only 0.09 percentage points. To provide a first glimpse at the relationship 
between institutional ownership and firm patenting, in panel A of Figure 1 we present the 
relationship between the log of one plus patent counts and firms’ institutional ownership. 
In panels B to D, we present the same graph but using fund, QFII, and other domestic 
                                                             
18 We delete observations that show any of the following issues: (i) total sales less than or equal to zero; 
(ii) capital per labor less than 0.01; (iii) missing values for major variables, including capital per labor, 
sales, state ownership, Tobin’s Q, ROA, leverage, and the Lerner Index. 
19 The observation with the largest patent stocks is ZTE, which is among the firms that also show up in 
other publications as largest applicants (e.g., WIPO, 2014). 
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institutional ownership, respectively. In all figures, a curve of the local linear regression 
is presented, which is estimated using the lowest smoother with a bandwidth of 0.8. 
Apparently, there is a positive correlation between patent counts and each ownership 
measure, although the estimated curve for mutual funds is steeper than that for other 
domestic institutional investors. 
The control variables, capital per labor, sales, age, Tobin’s Q, return on assets, and 
leverage, are winsorized at the 1% level in both tails to mitigate the influence of outliers. 
Our surveyed firms are relatively large with total sales at 2.6 billion yuan, with a high 
capital intensity (0.35 million yuan per labor), and have been listed for over six years on 
average. For financial variables, while the return on assets is low (3%), the leverage ratio 
is high (50%) and so is Tobin’s Q (2.53). 
We define three firm types based on state ownership: firms with no state ownership 
(POEs), firms with state ownership over 50% (major SOEs), and firms with state 
ownership no more than 50% but greater than 0% (minor SOEs). Consequently, 44% of 
our observations are POEs, 36% are minor SOEs, and 20% are major SOEs. The 
distribution is very close to that in Boeing et al. (2016) and resembles the privatization of 
firms in China’s manufacturing industries. 
In Table 2, we present firm characteristics of POEs, minor SOEs, and major SOEs, 
respectively. POEs and minor SOEs not only file almost twice as many patents as major 
SOEs but also receive twice as many citations per patent on average. It suggests that 
major SOEs are inferior with regard to the quantity and quality of innovation. 
Interestingly, institutional ownership among POEs and minor SOEs is several times 
higher than that among major SOEs. In the next section, we empirically investigate the 
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relationship between institutional ownership and firm innovation. 
 
4. Estimation Results 
In this section, we first develop the model specifications and estimate the gross and 
disaggregated effects of institutional ownership on firm patenting. Then, we employ 
several identification strategies to confirm the causality. We later analyze the mechanism 
and differentiate the extent of competition as well as firm types. Last, we take the quality 
of innovation into account. 
4.1. Model specification 
In our baseline model, we specify the relationship between institutional ownership and 
firm innovation as follows: ln�1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� = 𝛼𝛼1𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝛽𝛽1 + 
𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 + 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, (1) 
where subscripts 𝐼𝐼 and 𝑃𝑃 refer to firm and year, respectively. The dependent variable, ln�1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� is the natural logarithm of one plus patent counts for firm i in year 
𝑃𝑃.20 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼,𝑃𝑃−1 is the institutional ownership of firm i at the year end 𝑃𝑃-1. 𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼,𝑃𝑃−1 
represents a vector of one-year lagged firm characteristics, including ln(1+R&D stock), 
zero-R&D dummy, ln(capital per labor), ln(sales), ln(age), and two SOE dummies that 
control for minor and major SOEs. Industry dummies are defined at the 3-digit level and 
                                                             
20 Count data are often estimated by Poisson or negative binominal models (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, 
p.802). We employ OLS as our baseline model to make the comparability of coefficients more 
straightforward because our subsequent estimations (i.e., firm fixed effects, two-stage least square, and 
GMM) are also additive models. Our OLS specification is valid since the mean of the outcome variable is 
very close to 10, a benchmark proposed by Coxe et al. (2009). To address the concern that the 
log-transformation of the discrete patent counts influences our findings, we report estimates for Poisson and 
negative binomial models in the Appendix Table 1. As shown, in both specifications the coefficient on 
R&D stocks remains significantly positive, suggesting that our baseline model well captures firms’ 
innovation activities. 
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capture time-persistent differences in patenting across industries. Year dummies capture 
macro-economic shocks and time trends. 
If our main hypothesis is true, one should expect the coefficient on 
𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼,𝑃𝑃−1, 𝛼𝛼1 to be positive. Particularly, given that 𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼,𝑃𝑃−1  includes the R&D 
stock, the coefficient 𝛼𝛼1 indicates whether higher institutional ownership leads to more 
innovation output conditional on R&D investment (i.e., R&D productivity improvement). 
When the R&D stock is dropped, 𝛼𝛼1 will reflect the gross effect from both R&D 
productivity improvement and the increase in R&D investment. 
Even though all regressors are lagged by one year to avoid simultaneity, the estimated 
𝛼𝛼1 may still be biased if institutional investors select more innovative firms for 
investment. To address this potential source of endogeneity, we adopt three identification 
strategies as follows. First, if the investment is based on cross-firm patenting differences, 
we can solve the problem by controlling for firm fixed effects as in the following 
specification: ln�1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� = 𝛼𝛼2𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝛽𝛽2 + 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑑𝑑_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 + 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, (2) 
where firm dummies are used to replace industry dummies. 
However, endogeneity problems may still exist if institutional investors successfully 
predict changes in a firm’s patenting performance based on unobserved firm 
characteristics and trade accordingly. Our second identification strategy is an IV 
(Instrumental Variable) estimation. Following the standard process (Aghion et al., 2013; 
Yuan et al., 2008), we use an index-inclusion dummy as the instrument for institutional 
ownership. The dummy indicates whether a stock has been included in the Shanghai 180 
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Index21 or the Shenzhen Component Index; it equals one if so, and zero otherwise. 
The economic rationale behind the IV is as follows. On the one hand, institutional 
investors often mimic the index, which implies that when a stock is included in the index, 
it is more likely to have higher institutional ownership. Therefore, we expect a positive 
correlation between the index-inclusion dummy and institutional ownership. On the other 
hand, a stock’s inclusion in the index is because of its representativeness of a certain 
sector, not its patenting potential. Therefore, the exclusion condition is likely to be 
satisfied. Specifically, we estimate the following 2SLS (two-stage least squares) 
regression: 
𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼,𝑃𝑃−1 = 𝛾𝛾𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑃𝑃−1 + 𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼,𝑃𝑃−1𝛿𝛿 +𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 + 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1, (3) ln�1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� = 𝛼𝛼3𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃� 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝛽𝛽3 + 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 + 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. (4) 
In equation (3), the instrument is 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑃𝑃−1, which indicates whether firm i is included 
in the stock index in year t-1. 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃� 𝐼𝐼,𝑃𝑃−1 in equation (4) is the fitted value of 
𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼,𝑃𝑃−1 from the first-stage regression in equation (3). 
As sectoral representativeness and patenting potential may still be correlated for 
certain firms, we employ our third identification strategy, GMM estimation. Specifically, 
we follow Acemoglu et al. (2008) and O’Connor and Rafferty (2012) and estimate 
dynamic panel GMM models. The method was first developed by Anderson and Hsiao 
(1981). By time differencing equation (2), one can obtain: 
 
                                                             
21 The Shanghai 180 Index was launched in July 2002 so the index-inclusion dummy is equal to zero 
before 2002 for firms listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
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∆ln�1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� = 𝛼𝛼2∆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + ∆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝛽𝛽2 + 
𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 +  ∆ε𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, (5) 
where firm dummies are dropped due to the time differencing. Since the original residual 
,i tε  is no longer included, 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼,𝑃𝑃−2 is uncorrelated with ,i tε∆  (assume that 
there is no second-order serial correlation in ,i tε ). Therefore, it can be used as an 
instrument for ∆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 to obtain consistent estimates. 
Though Anderson and Hsiao’s (1981) method leads to consistent estimates, the 
efficiency of estimates can still be improved. Under the assumption that there is no 
high-order serial correlation in ,i tε , not only 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼,𝑃𝑃−2 but also all further lags of 
𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼,𝑃𝑃−1  are uncorrelated with ,i tε∆ , and thus can be used as additional 
instruments. Arellano and Bond’s (1991) difference-GMM estimation method uses all of 
these moment conditions and provides a more efficient estimator than Anderson and 
Hsiao (1981). We therefore estimate the difference-GMM model.22 
4.2. Baseline estimation 
First, in column (1) of Table 3, we estimate equation (1) without including institutional 
ownership to resemble a specification that is similar to a typical knowledge production 
function. Consistent with prior literature, R&D stocks are positively and significantly 
related to patent counts. However, 𝑅𝑅2 and the elasticity are lower than prior findings for 
OECD countries (Griliches, 1990). Our elasticity—a 1% increase in the R&D stock 
corresponds with a 0.14% increase in patent applications—is very close to the elasticity 
                                                             
22 To further improve the efficiency of Arellano and Bond’s (1991) estimator, Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998) develop the system-GMM estimator, which uses time-differenced 
instruments for level equation (2). These instruments are valid only if they are orthogonal to the firm fixed 
effect. This is unlikely the case here since the propensity of patenting is unlikely orthogonal to the firm 
fixed effect. 
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of 0.15% estimated by Hu et al. (2017) for Chinese manufacturing firms.23  
Different from Aghion et al. (2013) who find that the effect of capital intensity is 
significantly positive, the coefficient on ln(capital per labor) is insignificant and tends to 
be negative. This seems to indicate that a positive effect is offset by a negative effect, the 
latter originating from a special situation in China. During our examination period, China 
experienced a rise in wages of unskilled labor (Liang et al., 2016; Rong et al., 2015). 
Consequently, more labor-intensive (hence less capital-intensive) firms had incentives to 
apply capital-substituting-labor strategies (Tan and Zhang, 2016), either to increase 
profits by product innovation or to reduce production costs by process innovation. Recent 
evidence suggests that the latter is of greater importance in China, as Chinese applicants 
file substantially more patents protecting process innovation in China compared to the US 
(Eberhardt et al., 2016). Additionally, firm size, which is measured by ln(sales), has a 
positive and significant impact on patenting as larger firms typically maintain larger 
patent portfolios.24  
In columns (2) and (3), we rerun the regression by using current and two-year lagged 
R&D measures, respectively. In either case, the coefficient on R&D stocks barely 
changes, indicating a time-persistent influence of R&D stocks on firms’ patent counts. 
We also conduct an interim test to see how our baseline model reacts to the inclusion of 
firm fixed effects and obtain a less significant and smaller coefficient on R&D stocks. 
This finding suggests that over-time variations within a firm are less important than 
variations across firms to explain patenting activities, as R&D expenditures within a firm 
                                                             
23 Hu et al. (2017) justify a lower elasticity in China by discussing that indirect motivations other than 
R&D investment might be important but unobservable determinants of firm patenting in China. 
24 Since the inclusion of the zero-R&D dummy is only for the purpose of ensuring consistent estimates of 
the coefficient on R&D stocks, as a routine treatment in the literature its coefficient is not reported. Our 
results show that its coefficient is significantly positive perhaps because R&D complicacy delays a more 
innovative firm to prepare for reporting their R&D spending. 
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are smoothed over years and may not be sufficient to identify short-term changes in 
patenting. Nonetheless, we return to the firm fixed-effects specification as a robustness 
check when the effect of institutional ownership on firm patenting is estimated. 
In Table 4 we introduce institutional ownership back as in the baseline model. Column 
(1) estimates the parsimonious model by including only year and industry dummies. The 
coefficient on institutional ownership is positive and significant at the 1% level. Column 
(2) includes all the control variables except for R&D measures, and column (3) further 
includes R&D measures. In either case, the coefficient on institutional ownership remains 
positive and significant at the 1% level. When R&D measures are included, the 
coefficient on institutional ownership decreases from 0.0061 to 0.0053. The drop is 
relatively small, suggesting that the main effect of institutional ownership is through 
enhanced R&D productivity instead of increases in R&D investment. 25  Besides 
statistical significance, its magnitude also confirms economic significance: a 
10-percentage point increase in institutional ownership is associated with 5.3% more 
patent counts in the subsequent year. Additionally, the magnitude is comparable to 
previous studies. Aghion et al. (2013) show that a 10-percentage point increase in 
institutional ownership leads to 7% more patent counts. Not surprisingly, we also find 
that larger and younger firms are associated with higher patenting. It also reveals that 
minor SOEs are more productive in patenting, which is consistent with the finding by Cai 
and Tylecote (2008) that hybrid firms (i.e., minor SOEs) have the highest dynamic 
capacities of innovation. 
We further estimate different lagged effects of institutional ownership. In column (4), 
                                                             
25 We rerun the regressions by using R&D expenditures instead of R&D stocks and the major results barely 
change, which further confirms our argument of R&D productivity enhancement. 
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we use current institutional ownership as the variable of interest; in column (5), we use its 
two-year lagged value. Irrespective of the timing structure, the coefficient remains 
positive and highly significant. It is interesting to note that the coefficient becomes larger 
when a longer time lag is allowed for, suggesting that it takes time for institutional 
investors to materialize their influence on firm innovation. 
4.3. Different types of institutional investors 
We proceed to examine how the influence of institutional investors varies among three 
different institution types: mutual funds, QFIIs, and other domestic institutional investors. 
In columns (1) to (3) of Table 5, we estimate the effect of fund, QFII, and other domestic 
institutional ownership on firm patenting, respectively. The coefficient on fund ownership 
is positive and significant at the 1% level. Its magnitude indicates that a 10-percentage 
point increase in fund ownership leads to 13% more patent counts. In contrast, the 
coefficient on other domestic institutional ownership is insignificant. Particularly, the 
coefficient on other domestic institutional ownership is substantially smaller than that on 
fund ownership, suggesting that other domestic institutions are far less influential on firm 
innovation than mutual funds. This is consistent with Chen et al.’s (2007) finding that 
“independent” institutions such as mutual funds tend to monitor, but “grey” institutions 
do not. 
The coefficient on QFII ownership, weakly significant at the 15% level, is large in 
magnitude. Since QFII ownership is relatively small, we are interested in whether its 
positive effect comes from its interaction with other institutional investors, which have 
larger shares and thus have more incentives to monitor. Column (4) includes the 
interaction of QFII ownership and domestic institutional ownership (the sum of fund 
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ownership and other domestic institutional ownership). The coefficient on the interaction 
term is positive but insignificant while the coefficient on QFII ownership turns negative. 
It indicates that QFIIs’ influence is ignorable when domestic institutional investors are 
absent, and its influence indeed relies on the presence of domestic institutional investors. 
In column (5), we further examine whether the effect of QFIIs is triggered by mutual 
funds or other domestic institutional investors. It turns out that the effect of QFIIs relies 
on the presence of mutual funds but not other domestic institutions.  
In summary, these findings highlight the importance of mutual funds whereas the other 
two types seem negligible in the context of our study. This assessment is further 
confirmed by two investigations discussed below. First, we examine different lagged 
effects of these three ownership rates in Appendix Table 2. Column (1) uses their 
one-year lagged value, column (2) uses their current value, and column (3) uses their 
two-year lagged value. Our major results persist as the coefficient on fund ownership 
remains nearly unchanged no matter which lagged effect is examined. In contrast, the 
effects of the other two are mostly insignificant.  
Second, we analyze whether these correlations change over time. As mentioned, other 
domestic institutional ownership surged since 2006. To have a better idea of how this 
surge may have influenced the patenting effect of institutional ownership, in Table 6 we 
rerun the baseline regression for the sub-periods 2001-2006 and 2007-2010, respectively. 
We start with examining the gross effect of institutional ownership in columns (1) and (2). 
The coefficient on institutional ownership, though remaining significantly positive, is 
much lower in the latter period (0.014 vs. 0.0045), suggesting that the patenting effect of 
institutional ownership became less pronounced. The disaggregated estimation results 
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(columns 3 and 4) indicate that the coefficient on fund ownership is persistent over time 
(0.015 vs. 0.013), while the coefficient on other domestic institutional ownership turns 
insignificant and its magnitude is negligible in the post-2006 period. Combined with the 
fact that the proportion of other domestic institutional ownership has significantly 
increased after 2006, fund ownership thus contributes less to the gross effect of 
institutional ownership, which helps to explain the sharp drop of the coefficient on 
institutional ownership in the post-2006 period. Based on the above findings,26 we 
conclude that fund ownership is the major driving force behind the gross effect of 
institutional ownership.27 
4.4. Robustness tests 
It is possible that the positive relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
patenting is driven by institutional investors selectively investing in firms with more 
investment opportunities. Another possibility is that there are some unobservables 
correlated with both institutional ownership and firm patenting. In Table 7 we aim to 
address these endogeneity concerns regarding institutional ownership (panel A) and fund 
ownership (panel B), respectively. We first address omitted observables, then turn to 
time-invariant unobservable confounders, and finally address time-variant unobservable 
confounders. 
                                                             
26 We further confirm the importance of fund ownership by employing Poisson and negative binomial 
specifications in Appendix Table 3. While the coefficient on institutional ownership is significantly positive 
only for the Poisson specification, the coefficient on fund ownership remains significantly positive for both 
specifications. 
27 To investigate the heterogeneous effects of mutual funds, we divide mutual funds into three types based 
on Bushee’s (1998) classification: “quasi-indexed” (funds that are widely diversified and do not trade 
much), “dedicated” (funds that are more concentrated but do not trade much), and “transient” (funds that 
are diversified but trade often). Our results show that the coefficients on dedicated and transient fund 
ownership are both significantly positive, and the magnitude is similar to each other. In contrast, the 
coefficient on quasi-indexed fund ownership is insignificant. The insignificant effect of quasi-indexed 
funds is consistent with our argument that active monitoring is necessary. 
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One important omitted variable could be market value. It is likely that market value 
and patent applications are positively correlated. Institutional investors may prefer to 
purchase high market-value firms, leading to an upward bias when estimating the effect 
without control for market value. We thus include Tobin’s Q to control for market value, 
and further include leverage and return on assets to control for firms’ financial structure 
and profitability. As shown in column (1) of panels A and B in Table 7, the positive effect 
of either institutional ownership or fund ownership barely changes.28  
To address time-invariant unobservable confounders, we include firm dummies as 
specified in equation (2). As shown in column (2) of panels A and B, the coefficient on 
either institutional or fund ownership decreases but remains positive and significant at the 
1% level. Therefore, it is unlikely that the positive relationship mainly comes from 
time-invariant unobservables that are correlated with both firm patenting and institutional 
or fund ownership.  
To rule out the influence of time-variant unobservable confounders, we now adopt IV 
and GMM strategies. We first estimate the 2SLS specification of equations (3) and (4) by 
using the index-inclusion dummy as the instrument for institutional ownership. Columns 
(3) and (4) present the results for institutional ownership (panel A) and fund ownership 
(panel B). For the first-stage estimation (column 3), the coefficient on the index-inclusion 
dummy is positive and significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively, which is 
consistent with our expectation that the inclusion of a firm into the stock index indeed 
stimulates its institutional ownership. We conduct endogeneity tests to examine whether 
the OLS estimates are different from the 2SLS estimates. The null hypothesis of the 
                                                             
28 To control for the effect of the Split Share Structure Reform, we also rerun the regressions with the 
inclusion of a dummy indicating whether a firm has accomplished its reform. The major results remain 
unchanged, while the reform effect is positive but insignificant. 
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associated Hausman Chi-squared test is that there is no significant difference between 
these two estimates. The test statistic indicates that the 2SLS estimates are significantly 
different from the OLS estimates, implying serious endogeneity in the OLS model. Then, 
we perform the weak IV test to determine whether the instrument is sufficiently 
correlated with the endogenous regressor. In panel A the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 
is lower than the critical value at the 10% significance level (Stock and Yogo, 2005), 
indicating that our IV for institutional ownership might be subject to the weak IV 
problem. In contrast, in panel B the F-statistic is well above the critical value, indicating 
that our IV for fund ownership is strong. 
The second-stage estimation (column 4) shows that higher institutional or fund 
ownership is associated with significantly more patent counts. When the instrument is 
used, the estimated coefficient on institutional or fund ownership becomes larger, 
providing even stronger support for the causal relationship from institutional or fund 
ownership to firm patenting.  
Finally, we estimate the difference-GMM specification in column (5). We use 
𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼,𝑃𝑃−3 as well as its further lags as the instruments for ∆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1. The 
AR(2) test is the test for second-order serial correlation in ,i tε∆  with the null hypothesis 
of no serial correlation. Our AR(2) test shows that there is no significant second-order 
autocorrelation of ,i tε∆ . To test the validity of our instruments, we further conduct the 
Hansen test of overidentiﬁcation. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test is that all 
instruments are valid. Our Hansen test cannot reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, our 
GMM regression appears to be well specified. It shows that fund ownership causes 
significantly more patenting and the magnitude is comparable to that estimated in the 
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baseline model, while the effect of institutional ownership is positive but insignificant. 
Overall, compared to institutional ownership, the above findings make us more confident 
on a causal and positive effect of fund ownership on firm patenting. 
4.5. Mechanism analysis 
As we have discussed, the innovation effect of institutional ownership may come from 
either the career concern view or the rent seeking view. To examine which channel drives 
the result, we deepen our analysis by the following two approaches. First, we examine 
how the effect of institutional ownership on firm innovation would change when product 
market competition becomes more intense. While the career concern view predicts the 
effect should be strengthened when market competition is intensified, the rent seeking 
view predicts the opposite. Second, we examine cross-sectional differences for POEs, 
minor SOEs, and major SOEs. Our assumption is that, compared to those in POEs, CEOs 
in SOEs, especially those in major SOEs, are less likely to be replaced. Consequently, the 
career concern view predicts that the positive effect of institutional ownership on 
patenting among POEs should be more pronounced than that among SOEs. Again, the 
rent seeking view predicts the opposite. 
4.5.1. Institutional ownership and product market competition 
We first examine the interaction effect of institutional ownership and the extent of 
market competition, as measured by the Lerner Index.29 From the rent seeking view, the 
impact of market competition and the monitoring of institutional investors are substitutes. 
In contrast, the career concern view regards them as complements. 
In Table 8 we examine the interaction of institutional ownership and market 
                                                             
29 The Lerner index is defined as 𝐿𝐿 = (𝑃𝑃 −𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)/𝑃𝑃, where P is the product price and MC is the marginal 
cost. Since, the marginal cost is very difficult to measure, it is generally substituted by the average cost 
(Hirschey, 1985). 
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competition. Columns (1) and (2) rerun the baseline regression for firms with high 
competition and firms with low competition (based on the median of the Lerner Index in 
each year), respectively. In either case, the coefficient on institutional ownership is 
significantly positive. However, the coefficient in column (1) is similar to that in column 
(2) (0.0051 vs. 0.0049), which is inconsistent with the career concern view. In columns (3) 
and (4), we repeat the regressions by using fund ownership. Consistent with the career 
concern view, the effect of mutual funds is more pronounced when competition is more 
intense (0.039 vs. 0.0073), and the difference is statistically significant. 
Overall, though the results for institutional ownership are not consistent with the 
career concern view, we find consistent results when fund ownership is examined. It 
further supports our claim that it is fund ownership that drives the major results through 
the career concern channel. 
4.5.2. Institutional ownership and firm types 
In Table 9 we examine the heterogeneous effects of institutional ownership among 
POEs, minor SOEs, and major SOEs. In column (1) of panel A, we repeat the baseline 
regression among POEs. The coefficient on institutional ownership is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. Column (2) restricts the sample to minor SOEs, and the 
coefficient on institutional ownership is even higher than that for POEs (0.0098 vs. 
0.0054). Column (3) restricts the sample to major SOEs. The coefficient is no longer 
significant and turns negative. These results are consistent with our expectation that the 
effect of institutional ownership is stronger among POEs and minor SOEs than that 
among major SOEs. In columns (4) to (6), we repeat the regressions by using fund 
ownership instead of institutional ownership. The significant and positive effect of fund 
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ownership persists among POEs. Its magnitude is higher than that among either minor 
SOEs or major SOEs, which is consistent with our expectation. 
To confirm that our findings are robust to different thresholds, we change the threshold 
between POEs and minor SOEs and rerun the regressions on fund ownership. In columns 
(1) and (2) of panel B, we use 5% as the threshold; in columns (3) and (4), we use 10%. 
In either case, the fund effect remains highly significant and positive among POEs. These 
findings indicate that the effect of mutual funds is most pronounced for firms with zero or 
small state ownership. 
4.6. The quality of innovation 
As previously discussed, subsidies have contributed to China’s recent patent expansion 
at the detriment of patent quality. To avoid that we mistakenly confirm a mechanism 
between innovation and the presence of institutional investors whereas only patent 
applications increase but actual innovation remains unchanged, we use citation counts as 
an alternative measure of firms’ innovation output to check the robustness of our major 
results. As shown in summary statistics, the average citation counts are far lower than the 
average patent counts as only more valuable patents receive PCT citations. This 
requirement, though leading to a small number of citations, is necessary to ensure the 
quality of each citation. Therefore, by investigating citation counts, we are aiming to 
answer the following question: Now that we have found a positive effect of fund 
ownership on firm patenting, does such an effect still exist regarding firms’ most valuable 
patenting (i.e., patents that receive PCT citations)? 
In column (1) of Table 10, we first estimate the effect of fund ownership on citation 
counts for the full sample. Different from patent applications, which can be filed even 
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without having conducted formal R&D,30 forward citations can only be received for 
those observations with at least one patent application filed in the given year. We thus 
restrict our sample to firm-years with positive patent counts. Since the dependent variable, 
the log of one plus citation counts is continuous but truncated at zero, we employ a Tobit 
model. 
As shown, the coefficient on fund ownership is positive and significant at the 1% 
level.31 It indicates that a 10-percentage point increase in fund ownership is associated 
with 16% more citation counts. Sub-period estimations deliver consistent results as 
shown in columns (2) and (3). 
Last, we repeat the mechanism analysis and differentiate the extent of competition as 
well as firm types. Consistent with our previous results, columns (4) and (5) confirm that 
the effect of fund ownership is more pronounced when competition is more intense (0.04 
vs 0.014). We then examine the fund effect for three firm types in columns (6) to (8). 
Consistently, the effect is more pronounced among POEs (0.021) than that among minor 
SOEs (0.011), and both are significant at the 1% level. In contrast, the effect is the 
weakest among major SOEs (0.0067) and insignificant. It seems that while mutual funds 
still have a weak impact on the quantity of innovation produced by major SOEs, whose 
governmental performance indicators are usually defined in patent counts, there is no 
impact on the actual quality of innovation produced by these firms.32 
 
                                                             
30 Non-R&D invention is not unusual in developing countries and also exists in developed countries 
(Rammer et al., 2012). 
31 We rerun the regression by using institutional ownership instead of fund ownership and the major result 
persists. 
32 Compared to patent counts, citation counts are more likely subject to truncation bias in the later years. 
This issue should be partially solved by controlling for year fixed effects. As a robustness check, we rerun 
the regressions with the sample restricted to the years 2001-2008. The major results persist. 
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5. Discussion and policy implications 
In this section we present several recommendations to policy makers. We first address 
the positive effect of institutional investors on firm innovation. Then, we discuss its 
heterogeneity across institutional investor types and across firm types, respectively. Last, 
we highlight the importance of improving R&D productivity to current China. 
Consistent with prior studies on developed economies, we find that institutional 
investors, particularly mutual funds, positively influence firm innovation among POEs 
and minor SOEs, which compose the majority of Chinese listed firms. It suggests that 
regulatory efforts in promoting the development of mutual funds as institutional investors 
have generated positive impacts on firm innovation and should be carried on. It also 
suggests that those policy recommendations made by prior studies can also apply to 
transition economies, such as China. For instance, to reduce top managers’ innovation 
risk and so to reach a higher level of innovation, government authorities might grant 
institutional investors, particularly mutual funds, for better board representation in listed 
firms. Additionally, many innovation-related policy prescriptions to solve the rent seeking 
problem should be taken with caution if career concerns, instead of rent seeking, are top 
managers’ major agency problems for innovation. 
Our study extends prior research in two major ways. First, we document 
heterogeneous effects of different institutions. Particularly, we find that independent 
institutions such as mutual funds are effective in promoting firm innovation while other 
domestic institutions, which are generally granted as grey institutions, are not. Therefore, 
Chinese policy makers may like to put more efforts on cultivating mutual funds as well as 
other independent institutions for the purpose of promoting innovation. Additionally, we 
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find that the positive effect of QFII ownership exists but relies on the presence of mutual 
funds. Consistent with Bena et al. (2015) and Luong et al. (2014), it suggests that it is 
beneficial to encourage QFIIs’ entry to Chinese stock market. Meanwhile, to magnify 
their positive effect on innovation, more work should be done to induce QFIIs in China, 
whose shareholdings only account for a tiny proportion at the current stage, to invest in 
those firms with the presence of mutual funds. 
Second, our study also reveals that the effect of mutual funds varies significantly 
across different firm types. Specifically, in contrast to POEs and minor SOEs, we do not 
see much of a positive effect among major SOEs. POEs and minor SOEs are generally 
more profit oriented, and the related manager market is more competitive; consequently, 
leveraged by their expertise, mutual funds have more incentives to monitor, thereby 
stimulating these firms’ innovation. In contrast, due to their multiple targets and less 
competitive appointment and compensation scheme of CEOs, major SOEs’ innovation 
can hardly benefit from the presence of mutual funds. It seems that due to their 
government-controlled internal governance, major SOEs are genuinely immune from 
external governance.33 Consequently, without further privatization, the positive effect of 
mutual funds on innovation is seriously compromised among major SOEs. 
Unfortunately, interest groups that oppose privatization are on the rise in China. 
Although major SOEs may comply with policy targets, their low-cost achievement of 
patent quotas has an unexpected consequence that their patent applications have become 
disconnected from their productivity development in recent years (Boeing et al. 2016). It 
                                                             
33 This argument echoes Chan et al. (2014), whose finding suggests that state ownership may impede the 
effectiveness of external governance. They show that state ownership weakens mutual funds’ monitoring 
effect on financial reporting quality. Though they argue that the mechanism is that SOEs can receive 
financial support from governments, making them less dependent on the capital markets, it is reasonable to 
expect that the SOE manager market structure may also play a role. 
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is also documented that relying on SOEs to pursue a top-down approach to innovation 
results in misallocation of resources (Wei et al., 2016). In this aspect, encouraging private 
firms, which are generally discriminated, to go public may be a way to better utilize the 
capital market in terms of promoting firm innovation. Also, it may be helpful to 
encourage mutual funds to hold innovative firms’ stocks, which are mostly POEs and 
minor SOEs.  
The improvement of R&D productivity is crucial to China’s further growth, where 
innovation resources (e.g., high-quality scientific personnel) are relatively scarce. We 
have confirmed earlier research by Hu et al. (2017) in that the elasticity between R&D 
and patents is comparatively low in China. Considering the quality-quantity nexus of 
Chinese patents, we find that mutual funds not only have a positive effect on innovation 
quantity (i.e., patent counts) but also on innovation quality (i.e., citation counts), and this 
effect mainly comes from the enhancement of R&D productivity. Although privatization 
and market-oriented reforms have been slowing down in recent years, our finding 
suggests that the expansion of mutual funds provides an effective instrument to enhance 
R&D productivity for Chinese listed firms except for major SOEs. 
To sum up, our study suggests that developing institutional investors, particularly 
mutual funds, is beneficial for firm innovation both quantitatively and qualitatively in 
China. Our study also suggests that this positive effect would become more pronounced 
were partial-privatization and market liberalization pursued more rigorously. 
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6. Conclusion 
The beginning of the 21st century saw a rapid development in institutional investors in 
China’s stock market. Although some studies have found that institutional investors 
played a positive role in firms’ corporate governance (Yuan et al., 2008), it remains an 
open question whether the development of institutional investors has influenced firm 
innovation.  
By investigating Chinese listed firms’ patenting for 2002-2011, we find that (1) 
institutional ownership enhances firm patenting, (2) the effect is more pronounced when 
market competition is more intense, and (3) the effect exists among POEs and minor 
SOEs, but not among major SOEs. We also find the effect of institutional ownership on 
firm patenting mainly comes from mutual funds. Moreover, the above findings persist 
when the quality of innovation is examined. 
Our results shed light on the complicacy of a general perception that financial 
institutions in China play no role in firm performance: even though we find that other 
domestic institutional investors have little influence on firm innovation, we do find that 
mutual funds, as a portion of domestic institutional investors, enhance firm innovation.  
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Appendix 1. Variable definition 
Variable Definition  
Dependent variable 
Patent count Number of invention patent families applied for in a given priority year. 
Citation count Number of citation-weighted invention patent applications in a given priority year. We only 
consider PCT forward citations received by a patent application within a 3-year window 
since its publication date. 
Variable of interest  
Institution% Institutional ownership, defined as the sum of shares owned by all institutional investors as a 
percentage of the firm’s total shares outstanding at the year end. 
Dom. ins.% Domestic institutional ownership, defined as the sum of shares owned by all domestic 
institutional investors as a percentage of the firm’s total shares outstanding at the year end. 
Fund% Fund ownership, defined as the sum of shares owned by all domestic mutual funds as a 
percentage of the firm’s total shares outstanding at the year end. 
Other dom. ins.% Other domestic institutional ownership, defined as the sum of shares owned by all domestic 
institutional investors except for mutual funds as a percentage of the firm’s total shares 
outstanding at the year end. 
QFII% QFII ownership, defined as the sum of shares owned by QFIIs as a percentage of the firm’s 
total shares outstanding at the year end. 
Control variable  
Age  Number of years since the firm’s IPO. 
LEV  Leverage, defined as the ratio of total debts to total assets, measured at the end of the fiscal 
year. 
ROA  Return on assets, defined as operating income before depreciation divided by total assets, 
measured at the end of the fiscal year. 
Sales  Net sales in the fiscal year deflated to 2005 prices. 
Capital per labor Fixed assets over total employment at the end of the fiscal year deflated to 2005 prices. 
R&D stock Stock of R&D expenditures deflated to 2005 prices. To calculate the R&D stock, we rely on 
the perpetual investment method to calculate the R&D stock based on an annual growth rate 
of 5% and an annual depreciation rate of 15%. 
Tobin’s Q  Market value of equity plus total debts, scaled by total assets, measured at the end of the 
fiscal year. 
Lerner Index A firm’s Lerner Index is defined as total sales minus total costs divided by total costs, 
measured at the end of the fiscal year. 
POE POE dummy, equal to one if the firm’s state ownership is zero, and zero otherwise. 
Minor SOE Minor SOE dummy, equal to one if the firm’s state ownership is positive but not more than 
50%, and zero otherwise. 
Major SOE Major SOE dummy, equal to one if the firm’s state ownership is greater than 50%, and zero 
otherwise. 
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Appendix Table 1. Robustness test with count models 
    (1) (2) 
Dependent variable Patent count  
Specification Poisson Negative binominal 
ln(1+R&D stock) .44*** .22*** 
 (4.1) (4.1) 
ln(Capital per labor) -.27*** -.04 
 (-2.7) (-.73) 
ln(Sales) .9*** .62*** 
 (11) (13) 
ln(Age) -.096 -.06 
 (-.84) (-.75) 
Minor SOE .03 .024 
 (.18) (.23) 
Major SOE -.34* -.19 
 (-1.9) (-1.3) 
Year dummies Yes  
Industry dummies Yes  
Observations 8412 8412 
For all regressions, robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are estimated. t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** represent the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Column (1) uses a 
Poisson model as follows:  
,
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Appendix Table 2. Disaggregating institutional ownership by types, lagged effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Lagged effect of institutional ownership One-year lag Current Two-year lag  
F.Fund%  .013***  
  (4)  
F.QFII%  .034  
  (.94)  
F.Other dom. ins.%  .00075  
  (.53)  
Fund% .014***   
 (4.1)   
QFII% .054   
 (1.4)   
Other dom. ins.% .0019   
 (1.1)   
L.Fund%   .014*** 
   (3.5) 
L.QFII%   .057 
   (1.4) 
L.Other dom. ins.%   .0038* 
   (1.9) 
Control variables  Yes  
Year dummies  Yes  
Industry dummies  Yes  
Observations 8412 8412 7148 
Adjusted R2 0.297 0.296 0.297 
For all regressions, robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are estimated. t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** represent the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Appendix Table 3. Robustness test of the institution effect by using count models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ownership type Gross  Fund  
Specification Poisson Negative 
binominal 
Poisson Negative 
binominal 
Institution% .016*** .0021   
 (3.3) (.68)   
Fund%   .04*** .02*** 
   (4.6) (3.1) 
Control variables  Yes   
Year dummies  Yes   
Industry dummies  Yes   
Observations 8412 8412 8412 8412 
For all regressions, robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are estimated. t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** represent the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Figure 1. Time trend of institutional ownership, 2001-2010 
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Panel A. Institutional ownership Panel B. Fund ownership 
 
Panel C. QFII ownership Panel D. Other domestic institutional ownership 
 
Figure 2. Regression of patent counts on institutional ownership 
   This figure presents the nonparametric (local linear) regressions of firms’ patent counts and institutional ownership 
(panel A), patent counts and fund ownership (panel B), patent counts and QFII ownership (panel C), patent counts and 
other domestic institutional ownership (panel D), respectively. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 Mean S.D. Min. P25 Median P75 Max. 
Patent count 9.13 122.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 5937.00 
ln(1+Patent count) 0.81 1.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.39 8.69 
Citation count 1.16 33.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1697.00 
ln(1+Citation count) 0.10 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.44 
Institution% 11.09 17.11 0.00 0.22 2.86 14.39 92.55 
   Dom. ins.% 11.00 17.05 0.00 0.21 2.74 14.07 92.55 
       Fund% 3.53 6.92 0.00 0.00 0.24 3.56 55.55 
       Other dom. ins.% 7.48 14.27 0.00 0.00 0.80 6.57 84.76 
   QFII% 0.09 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.96 
R&D stock (mil. yuan) 67.25 463.28 0.00 0.00 1.59 35.66 18229.60 
Capital per labor (mil. yuan) 0.35 0.66 0.01 0.11 0.19 0.35 8.79 
Sales (mil. yuan) 2564.24 6035.78 11.97 403.52 893.27 2004.74 49361.53 
Age 6.75 4.39 0.00 3.00 7.00 10.00 18.00 
Tobin’s Q 2.53 1.79 0.88 1.39 1.97 3.01 11.21 
ROA 0.03 0.09 -0.37 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.23 
LEV 0.50 0.27 0.05 0.33 0.48 0.61 1.99 
Lerner Index 0.03 0.26 -1.00 0.01 0.05 0.11 1.00 
POE 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Minor SOE 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Major SOE 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Observations 8412       
All monetary terms are in real values (2005=100). Patent-related variables are calculated based on the observations 
from 2002 to 2011. The other variables are from 2001 to 2010. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics, by firm type 
    POE  Minor SOE  Major SOE  
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Patent count 9.60 141.36 10.32 128.41 5.85 29.76 
ln(1+Patent count) 0.87 1.17 0.82 1.18 0.64 1.11 
Citation count 1.16 33.51 1.58 42.02 0.36 4.29 
ln(1+Citation count) 0.10 0.43 0.11 0.45 0.08 0.37 
Institution% 16.80 21.50 8.19 12.09 3.72 6.50 
   Dom. ins.% 16.70 21.44 8.09 12.01 3.67 6.45 
       Fund% 4.23 7.57 3.37 6.92 2.26 4.91 
       Other dom. ins.% 12.47 18.58 4.72 8.89 1.41 3.35 
   QFII% 0.10 0.49 0.11 0.55 0.05 0.28 
R&D stock (mil. yuan) 81.35 622.05 55.49 276.58 57.53 291.77 
Capital per labor (mil. yuan) 0.33 0.62 0.37 0.76 0.35 0.56 
Sales (mil. yuan) 2111.73 4862.08 2433.55 5541.39 3822.00 8587.59 
Age 6.54 4.74 7.64 4.16 5.55 3.59 
Tobin’s Q 2.83 1.93 2.36 1.71 2.21 1.50 
ROA 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.08 
LEV 0.48 0.29 0.52 0.27 0.49 0.21 
Lerner Index 0.05 0.26 0.01 0.27 0.04 0.23 
Observations 3694  3070  1648  
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Table 3. Knowledge production function estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Lagged effect of R&D 1-year lag  Current 2-year lag 
F.ln(1+R&D stock)  .15***  
  (5.9)  
ln(1+R&D stock) .14***   
 (5.5)   
L.ln(1+R&D stock)   .14*** 
   (4.6) 
ln(Capital per labor) -.016 -.015 -.02 
 (-.65) (-.6) (-.77) 
ln(Sales) .29*** .28*** .31*** 
 (10) (10) (11) 
ln(Age) -.03 -.019 -.061 
 (-1.1) (-.68) (-1.4) 
Minor SOE .065 .068 .075 
 (1.4) (1.5) (1.5) 
Major SOE -.038 -.031 -.05 
 (-.72) (-.59) (-.87) 
Year dummies  Yes  
Industry dummies  Yes  
Observations 8412 8412 7148 
Adjusted R2 0.290 0.292 0.290 
For all regressions, robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are estimated. t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** represent the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4. The effect of institutional ownership on firm patenting 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged effect of 
institutional ownership 
1-year lag   Current  2-year lag 
Specification Without 
controls 
Without 
R&D 
With R&D With R&D With R&D 
F.Institution%    .0035***  
    (2.6)  
Institution% .012*** .0061*** .0053***   
 (6.5) (3.8) (3.4)   
L.Institution%     .0074*** 
     (3.9) 
ln(1+R&D stock)   .14*** .14*** .13*** 
   (5.4) (5.4) (4.9) 
ln(Capital per labor)  -.025 -.017 -.017 -.021 
  (-.99) (-.72) (-.69) (-.81) 
ln(Sales)  .32*** .27*** .28*** .28*** 
  (11) (10) (10) (9.8) 
ln(Age)  -.095*** -.049* -.039 -.058 
  (-3.2) (-1.7) (-1.3) (-1.3) 
Minor SOE  .11** .093** .071 .098** 
  (2.3) (2) (1.6) (2) 
Major SOE  -.0026 -.0072 -.03 -.02 
  (-.048) (-.13) (-.57) (-.34) 
Year dummies   Yes   
Industry dummies   Yes   
Observations 8412 8412 8412 8412 7148 
Adjusted R2 0.162 0.273 0.294 0.292 0.295 
For all regressions, robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are estimated. t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** represent the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5. Disaggregation of institutional ownership 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Institution type Fund QFII Other 
Domestic 
Interaction 
effects 
Interaction 
effects 
Fund% .013***    .012*** 
 (3.8)    (3.6) 
QFII%  .06  -.013 -.028 
  (1.6)  (-.3) (-.65) 
Other Dom. ins.%   .0017  .0012 
   (1)  (.7) 
QFII% *Fund%     .0039 
     (1.1) 
QFII%*Other dom. ins.%     .0021 
     (.75) 
QFII%*Dom. ins.%    .0032  
    (1.6)  
Dom. ins.%    .0037**  
    (2.5)  
Control variables   Yes   
Year dummies   Yes   
Industry dummies   Yes   
Observations 8412 8412 8412 8412 8412 
Adjusted R2 0.301 0.296 0.296 0.299 0.301 
For all regressions, robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are estimated. t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** represent the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 6. Institutional ownership effects, by period 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ownership type Gross  Disaggregated  
Period 2001-2006 2007-2011 2001-2006 2007-2011 
Institution% .014*** .0045***   
 (4) (2.8)   
Fund%   .015*** .013*** 
   (3.4) (3.5) 
QFII%   .022 .13** 
   (.52) (2.4) 
Other dom. ins.%   .011* .002 
   (1.9) (1.1) 
Observations 5347 3065 5347 3065 
Adjusted R2 0.261 0.252 0.260 0.258 
For all regressions, all control variables, year dummies, and industry dummies are included. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level are estimated. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent the 
significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 7. Robustness tests 
Panel A. The effect of institutional ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Specification OLS 
More controls 
FE 2SLS 
1st-stage 
 
2nd-stage 
GMM 
Index or not   1.8**   
   (2.1)   
Institution% .0051*** .0038***  .22* .0034 
 (3.3) (3.6)  (2) (1.4) 
Tobin’s Q .06***     
 (4.8)     
ROA -.76***     
 (-3.1)     
LEV -.13     
 (-1.4)     
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes No Yes Yes No 
Firm dummies No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 8412 8412 8412 8412 7148 
Adjusted R2 0.299 0.233 0.441   
Hausman Chi-squared Test 
P-value 
   0.035  
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic    4.5  
P-value for AR(2) Test     .61 
P-value for Hansen Test     .46 
Panel B. The effect of fund ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Specification OLS 
More controls 
FE 2SLS 
1st-stage 
 
2nd-stage 
GMM 
Indexing or not   2.2***   
   (4.9)   
Fund% .012*** .0087***  .18*** .014** 
 (2.8) (3.7)  (3.7) (2.3) 
Tobin’s Q .048***     
 (3.7)     
ROA -.91***     
 (-3.7)     
LEV -.13     
 (-1.4)     
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes No Yes Yes No 
Firm dummies No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 8412 8412 8412 8412 7148 
Adjusted R2 0.301 0.233 0.212   
Hausman Chi-squared Test 
P-value 
   0.000  
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic    24  
P-value for AR(2) Test     .58 
P-value for Hansen Test     .49 
For all regressions, robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are estimated. t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** represent the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 8. The effect of institutional ownership on firm patenting, by competition extent 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ownership type Institution  Fund  
Competition extent High  Low  High  Low  
Institution% .0051** .0049***   
 (2.1) (2.6)   
Fund%   .039*** .0073** 
   (3.8) (2.1) 
Observations 4203 4209 4203 4209 
Adjusted R2 0.280 0.317 0.294 0.316 
For all regressions, all control variables, year dummies, and industry dummies are included. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level are estimated. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent the 
significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
  
64 
Table 9. The effect of institutional ownership on firm patenting, by firm type 
Panel A. Threshold, 0%-50% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ownership type Institution   Fund   
Firm type POE Minor SOE Major SOE POE Minor SOE Major SOE 
Institution% .0054*** .0098*** .038    
 (3.1) (3.4) (.21)    
Fund%    .019*** .012** .015* 
    (4.1) (2.3) (1.7) 
Observations 3694 3070 1648 3694 3070 1648 
Adjusted R2 0.257 0.333 0.120 0.264 0.331 0.356 
Panel B. Alternative thresholds 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Threshold 5%  10%  
Firm type POE Minor SOE POE Minor SOE 
Fund% .015*** .013 .015*** .012 
 (4.1) (1.4) (4.1) (1.3) 
Observations 5587 1369 5709 1247 
Adjusted R2 0.270 0.237 0.272 0.253 
For all regressions, all control variables, year dummies, and industry dummies are included. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level are estimated. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent the 
significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 10. The effect of fund ownership on citation counts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Sample Full 2001- 
2006 
2007- 
2011 
Competition 
extent       
High 
                             
 
Low 
Firm type 
 
POE 
                             
 
Minor 
SOE 
           
 
Major 
SOE 
Fund% .016*** .019*** .015*** .04** .014*** .021*** .011*** .0067 
 (7.7) (4.6) (7.2) (2.3) (5.3) (7.7) (3.9) (.27) 
Observations 3413 1202 2211 1703 1710 1668 1238 507 
For all regressions, all control variables, year dummies, and industry dummies are included. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level are estimated. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent the 
significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
